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中文摘要 
本研究目的乃在探討公司所運用的更換會計師威脅手段是否損害了會計師
的超然獨立性，以及影響更換威脅是否成功的決定因素。以會計師簽發非
標準式審計意見的可能作為會計師獨立性的替代衡量，對更換威脅的衡
量，則主要在評估公司收到非標準式審計意見下撤換會計師的條件機率與
收到標準式審計意見下撤換會計師的條件機率二者之差異。非標準式審計
意見的類型有二：一是提及其他會計師；二是繼續經營疑慮。實證結果顯
示，當公司不願收到「提及其他會計師」類型之審計意見而施加更換威脅
時，會計師簽發無保留意見的機率增加，顯示更換威脅成功，且在查核任
期之初期階段更增加成功的機率。相對地，當公司不願收到「繼續經營疑
慮」類型之審計意見而施加更換威脅時，會計師簽發無保留意見的機率不
僅沒有增加，反而降低，顯示更換威脅失敗，但大型客戶卻減弱了失敗的
機率，而產業專家則是增強更換威脅失敗的機率。二種不適當審計意見類
型的差異在於法律責任輕重的不同，由此可知法律責任是維持會計師獨立
性的關鍵要素。 
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Abstract 
This study investigates whether dismissal threat imposed by clients jeopardizes 
auditor independence, where auditor independence is surrogated by auditor's 
propensity to issue nonstandard audit opinions, and the determinants of 
dismissal threat. We use an auditor switch model to predict the unobserved 
switches clients would have made had they received opposite audit opinions 
and we test their effect on audit opinions. We classify a nonstandard audit 
opinion as referring (1) other auditor and (2) going concern problems. The 
results show that there is a significantly negative association between 
nonstandard audit opinion and dismissal threat by clients unwilling to receive 
an audit opinion modified for referring other auditor. This implies auditor 
independence would be impaired by dismissal threat about other auditor. 
Furthermore, the results of the determinants of dismissal threat show that 
auditor independence would be more severely impaired in the early years of 
auditor tenure. On the other hand, there is a significantly positive association 
between nonstandard audit opinion and dismissal threat by clients unwilling to 
receive an audit opinion modified for going concern problems. This implies 
auditor independence does not affected by dismissal threat about going concern. 
Furthermore, the success probability of dismissal threat about going concern 
would be increased by large clients and decreased by industry specialist. The 
difference between these two inappropriate audit opinions depends on legal 
liability. Hence, market-based incentives, such as loss of reputation and 
litigation costs, are essential to auditor independence. 
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